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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - APPELLATE REVIEW OF SEN-
TENCING - SENTENCING GUIDELINES - SENTENCING 
JUDGE'S MISTAKEN APPLICATION OF SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES DID NOT REQUIRE APPELLATE COURT TO VACATE 
SENTENCE WHEN SENTENCE WAS WITHIN STATUTORY 
LIMITS AND WAS THE RESULT OF THE JUDGE'S GOOD 
FAITH EXERCISE OF DISCRETION. Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 
470 A.2d 337 (1984). 
Teasley was convicted in the circuit court of robbery and use of a 
handgun in the commission of a felony, and was sentenced to consecutive 
ten year terms of imprisonment. l After exhausting the remedies for sen-
tence review provided in the Maryland Code and in the Maryland Rules 
of Procedure,2 Teasley appealed his sentence to the court of special ap-
peals. He claimed that the trial judge had misapplied the sentencing ma-
trix system of the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Manual by sentencing 
him to consecutive terms rather than concurrent terms.3 The court of 
special appeals, noting that the judge's use of the sentencing guidelines 
was voluntary, held that the sentence was beyond appellate review be-
cause it was within statutory limits and was not motivated by ill will, 
prejudice, or other improper considerations.4 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland agreed, holding that as long as the sentence was lawfully im-
posed within statutory limits and was the result of the judge's good faith 
exercise of discretion, failure to apply the guidelines did not warrant va-
cating the sentence.s The court refused to extend the scope of appellate 
review of a criminal sentence in Maryland to include an appeal based on 
the judge's mistaken application of the sentencing guidelines.6 
Traditionally, the trial judge enjoyed wide discretion in the sentenc-
ing process.7 The legal system's major concern was with the determina-
tion of guilt; once guilt was established, state legislatures provided 
guidance only in terms of the statutory minimum and maximum 
sentences for a particular offense.8 There were no standards or objective 
criteria against which the sentencing judge could gauge his sentence de-
1. Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 368, 470 A.2d 337, 339 (1984). 
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645JA - 645JG (1982 Rep!. Vol. & Supp. 1984) (pro-
viding for review of any sentence of more than two years imprisonment by a panel 
of three or more trial judges empowered to order a different sentence than the one 
imposed by the sentencing judge); MD. R.P. 4-344 (outlining the procedure for ap-
plying for sentence review pursuant to article 27, §§ 645JA - 645JG of the Maryland 
Code); MD. R.P. 4-345 (allowing a court to correct any illegal sentence at any time, 
and permitting a defendant to file a motion with the sentencing judge to modify, 
reduce, or vacate the sentence). 
3. Teasley v. State, 54 Md. App. 454, 455, 458 A.2d 93,94 (1983), affd, 298 Md. 364, 
470 A.2d 337 (1984). 
4.Id. 
5. Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 370-71, 470 A.2d 337, 340 (1984). 
6. Id. at 370, 470 A.2d at 340. 
7. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCE 5 (1972); TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK 
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 11 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT]. 
8. Blumstein, Research on Sentencing, 7 JuST. Sys. J. 307, 307 (1982); von Hirsch, 
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termination.9 In addition, no courts provided any effective appellate re-
view of sentences. to Unlike most determinations made by a trial judge, a 
sentence could not be appealed as long as it was within the statutory 
range for the offense, unless imposition of the sentence constituted an 
abuse of judicial discretion. I I Abuse of discretion was so narrowly de-
fined that reviewing courts tended to limit their function to correcting 
only the most serious abuses. 12 The lack of sentencing standards and 
absence of appellate review often led to discrepant sentences that were 
"inequitably disparate, dangerously lenient, or oppressively harsh."13 
Dissatisfaction with the trial court's uncontrolled sentencing discre-
tion was one of the factors that led to the sentence reform movement of 
the 1970's. 14 The goal of sentence reform was to reduce disparity in sen-
tencing by replacing unstructured judicial discretion with rules of law to 
guide the sentencing process and by providing appellate review of the 
sentencing procedure. IS New models for sentencing arose quickly. 16 The 
basic concept of the reform movement was that sentences should be defi-
nite and equitable and should impose punishment that corresponds to the 
Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing Theory, 42 MD. L. REV. 6, 8-9 
(1983). 
9. FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 11. 
10. M. FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 75-76. 
11. Stem, Government Appeals of Sentences: A Constitutional Response to Arbitrary and 
Unreasonable Sentences, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 51 (1980). 
12. Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences: Penology on the Judicial Doorstep, 68 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 122, 128 (1977); see, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 450 
F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1971) (case remanded because trial judge failed to consider appli-
cability of Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1982»; United 
States v. Weston,448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971) (sentence vacated because trial judge 
relied on false information in sentencing the defendant); United States v. Wiley, 278 
F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960) (sentence vacated because district court arbitrarily had 
imposed a more serious sentence on a minor defendant than it had imposed upon 
the co-defendants). 
13. Ozanne, Bringing the Rule of Law to Criminal Sentencing: Judicial Review, Sen-
tencing Guidelines and a Policy of Just Desserts, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 721, 734 
(1982). 
14. M. FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 69; Kennedy, Criminal Sentencing: A Game of 
Chance, 60 JUDICATURE 208, 208-13 (1976); Richey, Appellate Review of Sentenc-
ing: Recommendation for a Hybrid Approach, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 71 (1978); von 
Hirsch, supra note 8, at 31. ' 
15. Tonry, Criminal Law: The Missing Element in Sentencing Reform, 35 VAND. L. 
REv. 607, 616 (1982); see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.11 (West Supp. 1984); 42 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781 (purdon 1982 & Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9.94A.210 (West Supp. 1984). For a discussion regarding states that have devel-
oped sentencing guidelines, see von Hirsch, Commensurability and Crime Preven-
tion: Evaluating Formal Sentencing Structures and their Rationale, 74 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 209 (1983). 
16. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1984) (punishment must be pro-
portionate to the seriousness of the offense with provision for uniformity in the 
sentences of offenders committing the same offense under similar circumstances); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 244.09-.11 (West Supp. 1984) (establishing a commission to 
specify sentencing guidelines and provide for appellate review of sentencing); 42 PA. 
CoNS. STAT. ANN, § 2154 (Purdon 1981) (creating a commission to establish sen-
tencing guidelines). 
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seriousness of the criminal act. 17 Rehabilitation no longer was espoused 
as the primary justification for sentences. IS Efforts to establish sentence 
guidelines varied from state to state, but each effort had two basic aims: 
to make sentencing policy more explicit and more rational. 19 
Many jurisdictions sought to control judicial discretion by providing 
for more extensive appellate review ofsentences.2o In 1968, the American 
Bar Association advocated the adoption of appellate review of sentences 
on their merits.21 The states that followed the ABA's advice and statuto-
rily authorized sentence review generally adopted one of two approaches: 
review by a panel of trial court judges whose authority is limited to con-
sideration of the sentence itself, or review by an appeals court.22 Several 
states that have adopted sentencing guidelines have also included a provi-
sion in the guidelines for appellate review of sentences.23 
17. J. MILLER, M. ROBERTS & C. CARTER, SENTENCING REFORMS: A REVIEW AND 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 25 (1981). 
18. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Propos-
alsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 552 (1978). 
In 1982 the American Bar Association issued a report on sentencing that recom-
mended that sentencing schemes attempt to reach a middle ground between 
mandatory sentencing by the legislature and uncontrolled discretion in the courts. 
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SEN-
TENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 18-2.1 (1982). The report recom-
mended the establishment of a "guideline drafting agency" to develop criteria for 
alternatives to sentencing and for statutory ranges for offenses. Id. In this scheme, 
the sentencing judge would be required to impose a sentence within the range unless 
aggravating or mitigating factors justified a greater or lesser term of imprisonment. 
Id. § 18-3.1. 
19. Forst and Wellford, Punishment and Sentencing: Developing Sentencing Guidelines 
Empirically from Principles of Punishment, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 799, 800 (1981). 
20. See, e.g., W. RICH, L. SUTTON, T. CLEAR, M. SAKS, SENTENCING BY MATHEMAT-
ICS: AN EVALUATION OF THE EARLY ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 5-6 (1982) [hereinafter cited as W. RICH]. Twenty-seven 
states now have statutes authorizing sentence review, and four allow review by ap-
pellate court decision. In five states sentence appeals are not usually permitted; rare 
reversals occur, however, because sentences are found to have been motivated by 
passion or prejudice. Zalman, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Antinomy of 
Law Reform, 1983 DET. C.L. REv. 1513, 1515-16. 
21. STANDARDS RELATING TO ApPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES §§ 1.1-3.4 (1968). 
This report states that the major goals to be served by appellate review of sentencing 
are: (1) to provide the criminal justice system with a means by which grossly exces-
sive sentences can be corrected; (2) to provide for articulation of reasons for 
sentences to improve each sentence and to develop a rational sentencing policy; (3) 
to induce respect for the law by ensuring a sensible, reasoned sentence; and (4) to 
focus the appellate court on the sentencing issue and to avoid an unnecessary retrial 
where only the sentence is defective. Id. § 1.2. 
22. A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 127 (1978). In states that do not provide 
for statutory sentence review, some courts construe their authority to review 
sentences from their general appellate power "to affirm, modify, vacate. . . or re-
verse any judgment ... [and] direct the entry of such appropriate judgment ... as 
may be just under the circumstances." Id. § 128. 
23. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.11 (West Supp. 1984) (creating a presumptive 
sentence; appellate courts review inter alia the reasons for the trial court's departure 
from the guidelines); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781 (purdon 1982 & Supp. 1984) 
(appellate courts empowered to vacate a sentence upon a finding that the sentencing 
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In 1979 the Maryland judiciary, recognizing the need to establish 
uniformity in the sentencing process, formed a committee of judges to 
develop sentencing guidelines.24 The committee used an historical ap-
proach,25 developing the guidelines from sentences actually imposed in 
the circuit courts. The major goals of the sentencing guidelines were: 
(1) to increase equity in sentencing; (2) to articulate an explicit sentenc-
ing policy that is regularly reviewed and updated; (3) to provide informa-
tion for judges; and (4) to promote increased visibility and understanding 
of the sentencing process.26 The guidelines would reduce sentencing dis-
parity by informing the sentencing judge of sentences previously imposed 
with respect to similar defendants who committed similar crimes in simi-
lar circumstances.27 As long as a judge sentences within the guidelines' 
range, a charge of irrational disparity cannot be supported because the 
sentence comports with the experience of the judge's peers.28 
Since July 1, 1983, judges in the circuit courts of Maryland have been 
using guidelines in all cases originating in circuit courts and involving 
crimes against persons, crimes against property, and crimes involving 
controlled dangerous substances.29 Maryland's guidelines process is 
compatible with systems in several states that have followed the histori-
cal norms approach in developing guidelines.30 Maryland's system, like 
nearly all forms of guidelines currently in use, is intended to be advisory 
judge purported to sentence within the guidelines, but applied the guidelines errone-
ously); WASH. REv. CoDE § 9.94A.210 (West Supp. 1984) (only sentences inconsis-
tent with the guidelines appealable). 
24. MARYLAND SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (rev. Oct. 1982) [hereinafter cited 
as MARYLAND GUIDELINES]. The Guidelines were first implemented voluntarily in 
1981 in the circuit courts in Baltimore City, Harford, Montgomery, and Prince 
George's counties. The Guidelines were modified in 1982 and implemented on a 
statewide basis by the Maryland Judicial Conference on July 1, 1983. 
25. See generally Forst and Wellford, supra note 19, at 818-32 (discussing the several 
basic approaches used to formulate sentencing policy). Sentencing guidelines based 
on historical norms have been used in several court systems including those of Den-
ver, Chicago, Philadelphia, Newark, and Phoenix, as well as in the states of Minne-
sota and New Jersey. Forst and Wellford, supra note 19, at 818-19. For an 
evaluation of the guidelines systems used in Chicago, Philadelphia, Newark, and 
Phoenix, see W. RICH, supra note 20. 
26. MARYLAND GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at ii. 
27. SENTENCING GUIDELINES BOARD STAFF OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE CoURTS, MARYLAND'S JUDICIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2 (September 4, 
1984) (available in the University of Baltimore Law Review Office) [hereinafter 
cited as GUIDELINES REPORT)' 
28. Id. To determine the guideline sentence for a specific crime, the judge must first 
ascertain the offender and offense score from a fixed set of criteria assigned various 
numerical weights based on importance. The judge completes the guidelines work-
sheet and consults the sentence matrix, which presents sentences in a grid with dif-
ferent rows and columns corresponding to increasing seriousness of the offense and 
of the offender's prior record. The matrix indicates the range of sentences recom-
mended for each combination of offender and offense scores. Id. 
29. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 27, at 4-5. 
30. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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rather than mandatory. 31 The guidelines complement the sentencing 
process rather than replace judicial discretion.32 Judges may sentence 
outside the guidelines' range, but they are requested to state in writing 
their reasons for any departure. 33 
Maryland's sentencing guidelines format differs, however, from sev-
eral of the other states' systems in its failure to provide for appellate 
review of the guidelines process. Appellate review in Maryland does not 
extend to the judge's use of the sentencing guidelines. 34 Maryland pro-
vides for sentence review by a panel of trial judges authorized to impose a 
different sentence from the one imposed by the sentencing judge.3s 
Maryland, however, only recognizes three grounds for appellate review 
of sentences: (1) the sentence may not constitute cruel and unusual pun-
ishment or violate any other constitutional requirement;36 (2) the sen-
tencing judge may not be motivated by ill will, prejudice, or other 
impermissible considerations;37 and (3) the sentence must be within stat-
utory limits.38 
31. Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 367,470 A.2d 338, 340 (1984) (citing MARYLAND 
GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at ii); Durbin v. State, 56 Md. App. 442, 447, 468 A.2d 
145, 148 (1983); see also L. WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GoTTFREDSON, J. CALPIN, & A. 
GELMAN, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION vii 
(1978). 
32. Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 367, 370, 470 A.2d 337, 338, 340 (1984); Durbin v. 
State, 56 Md. App. 442, 447, 468 A.2d 145, 148 (1983); MARYLAND GUIDELINES, 
supra note 24, at ii. 
33. Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 367,470 A.2d 337, 338 (1984); Durbin v. State, 56 
Md. App. 442, 447, 468 A.2d 145, 148 (1983); see GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 
27, at 2; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643C (Supp. 1984) (providing that 
"[n]othing in this article may be construed to prohibit the use of judicial guidelines 
in setting sentences," except that (1) the guidelines may not prescribe a sentence 
"exceeding the maximum sentence provided by law," and (2) the guidelines may not 
recommend a sentence that violates any "mandatory minimum sentence prescribed 
by law"). 
34. Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 370,470 A.2d 338, 340 (1984). 
35. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645JA - 645JG (1982 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 1984); MD. 
R.P. 4-344. MD. R.P. 4-345 also permits a defendant to file a motion with the 
sentencing judge to modify, reduce, or strike the sentence. 
36. Cases authorize appellate review of sentences when objections to sentencing proce-
dures are made on due process grounds. See Costello v. State, 237 Md. 464, 206 
A.2d 812 (1965); Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570 (1952). An important 
due process requirement is that offenders must be given the opportunity to refute 
adverse information. Id. at 31-32, 92 A.2d at 573-74. 
37. For examples of impermissible considerations, see Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 
358 (1977) (due process applies to sentencing procedure); United States v. Tucker, 
404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972) (sentence based in part on previous conviction in viola-
tion of right to counsel is invalid); Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 538-40, 336 A.2d 
113, 116-18 (1975) (remarks of sentencing judge that he punished defendant more 
severely because defendant did not plead guilty were impermissible); Purnell v. 
State, 241 Md. 582, 584, 217 A.2d 298, 299-300 (1966) (trial judge, in determining 
sentence, must not ~nsider mere accusations that defendant committed crimes 
other than the crime for which he is being sentenced); Walker v. State, 186 Md. 440, 
443, 47 A.2d 47, 48 (1946) (it is improper for trial judges to base sentence on 
charges of crimes for which defendant had been acquitted). 
38. Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 632 (1981); Clark v. State, 284 Md. 260, 396 
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In Teasley, the Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to vacate the 
sentence, rejecting the appellant's argument that the trial judge's misap-
plication of Maryland's sentencing guidelines constituted an improper 
exercise of discretion.39 The court was not convinced that the judge had 
erred in sentencing Teasley to consecutive terms rather than concurrent 
terms as required by the guidelines.40 The Teasley court stated that the 
judge's explicit refusal to follow the ABA rationale recommending con-
current sentences was indicative of her probable rejection of the similar 
Maryland guidelines.41 The court also recognized that the judge had ex-
pressly articulated the reason for departure from the concurrent sentence 
recommendation: Teasley's criminal record required a sentence that re-
flected the need to protect the public.42 
The court reiterated Maryland's position on appellate review of sen-
tencing as extremely limited.43 The only restraints on a judge's power to 
sentence in Maryland are that the sentence not constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment or otherwise violate constitutional requirements; that 
the judge not be motivated by ill-will, prejudice, or other improper con-
siderations; and that the sentence fall within statutory limits.44 The 
court, finding that none of these grounds was present in Teasley, rea-
soned that consecutive sentences are not per se cruel and unusual punish-
ment.4S The court also found it not improper for a Maryland trial judge 
to decline to apply the guidelines or to apply them improperly, because 
the guidelines complement rather than replace the judge's sentencing dis-
cretion.46 The court also indicated that the sentence was lawfully within 
statutory limits and was a good faith exercise of judicial discretion.47 
Teasley presents an anomalous development in Maryland law. 
Maryland's sentencing guidelines have been implemented on a statewide 
basis since 1983,48 and Teasley is the first Maryland case at the appellate 
A.2d 243 (1979). These cases illustrate the breadth of the trial judge's discretion 
when the sentence does not exceed statutory limits. In Logan, the court of appeals 
upheld the sentence, refusing to limit the judge's discretion even when the judge 
used an unconstitutionally procured confession. Logan, 289 Md. at 486, 425 A.2d 
at 645. Similarly, in Clark the court of appeals refused to vacate a sentence that the 
defendant claimed was improperly motivated because the trial judge had com-
mented at sentencing that the defendant resembled a notorious criminal. Clark, 284 
Md. at 275, 396 A.2d at 251. 
39. Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 369-70,470 A.2d 337, 339-40 (1984). 
40. Id. at 370, 470 A.2d at 340. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 368, 470 A.2d at 339. 
43. Id. at 370, 470 A.2d at 340. 
44. Id. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
45. Id. at 370-71, 470 A.2d at 340. 
46.Id. 
47. Id. at 371, 470 A.2d at 340. The court noted that Teasley was entitled to review of 
his sentence by a panel of trial judges under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645JA-
645JG and under Md. R.P. 773 (1977), and by the sentencing judge under Md. R.P. 
774 (1977). (These rules are currently MD. R.P. 4-344 and 4-345). 
48. Teasley v. State, 298 Md. at 367, 470 A.2d at 338-39; MARYLAND GUIDELINES, 
supra note 24, at ii. 
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level to consider the role of the guidelines in the sentencing process. One 
of the goals of Maryland's sentencing guidelines is to increase equity in 
sentencing by reducing unwarranted variation, while retaining judicial 
discretion to individualize sentences.49 Because the Teasley court found 
the guidelines advisory, to the point that judges may improperly apply or 
entirely decline to apply the guidelines, this goal of equity and increased 
consistency may be difficult to attain. Teasley may not itself implicate 
this problem because the trial judge had valid reasons for Teasley's sen-
tence, and the sentence was equitable under the circumstances. so The 
potential exists, however, for the goals of the guidelines to be ignored 
. because, as Teasley holds, a mistaken application of or a failure to apply 
the guidelines will not be reviewed by the appellate courtS.51 The Teasley 
court steadfastly asserted the limited appellate review authority over the 
sentencing process by refusing to extend appellate review to these 
situations. 52 
Implementation of sentencing guidelines and appellate review of the 
sentencing process serve as a restraint upon judicial discretion and are 
natural components of a sentencing guidelines system. 53 Guidelines can 
substantially lessen, if not eliminate, the traditional impediments to sub-
stantive sentence review by providing operating rules for sentencing deci-
sions and by relieving appellate courts of the difficulty of establishing 
specific rules for a sentencing policy. 54 Sentence variation without valid 
grounds and sentencing standards without a public policy basis can be 
minimized while still retaining some degree of judicial discretion. Appel-
late courts can perform three significant functions under a sentencing 
guidelines system: (1) they can review a sentence within the guidelines' 
range to determine if the guidelines were applied erroneously; (2) they 
can review a sentence outside the guidelines' range to determine if the 
reasons for departure are valid; and (3) the courts can review the guide-
lines themselves to evaluate whether the guidelines comply with public 
policy. 55 Maryland law does provide for judicial review of a sentence by 
either the sentencing judge or a panel of trial judges. 56 Review by the 
appellate courts, however, has the advantage of refining sentencing policy 
through the development of a body of precedent upon which the sentenc-
ing judge can rely. 57 
The sentencing guidelines system is still in its infancy in Maryland. 
49. MARYLAND GUIDELINES, supra note 24, at ii. See supra note 26 and accompanying 
text. 
50. Teasley v. State, 298 Md. at 370, 470 A.2d at 340. 
51. Id. at 370-71,470 A.2d at 340. 
52.Id. 
53. Ozanne, supra note 13, at 741; Zalman, supra note 20, at 1522. 
54. Ozanne, supra note 13, at 741. 
55. Id. at 741-44. 
56. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645JA - 645JG (1982 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 1984); MD. 
R.P. 4-344 to -345. 
57. Labbe, supra note 12, at 133. 
610 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
The system is maturing steadily, however, with judges submitting guide-
lines' worksheets at an annual rate of 10,000 to 12,000.58 As the guide-
lines process develops, it may be a wise strategy for the Maryland courts 
or legislature to extend appellate review of sentencing to the judicial ap-
plication of or departure from the sentencing guidelines, as other courts 
and legislatures have done. 59 This extension of appellate review author-
ity, however, will not be granted soon. As Teasley demonstrates, the 
court of appeals is unwilling to recognize the improper application of the 
sentencing guidelines as a basis for an appeal. Unless the case fits within 
one of the three traditional grounds for appellate review of a sentence in 
Maryland,60 the trial judge's sentencing determination will not be 
disturbed. 
Mary Elizabeth Wildemann 
58. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 27, at 5. 
59. See supra text accompanying note 23. Pennsylvania authorizes the type of appellate 
review of the sentencing guidelines that was at issue in Teasley. See 42 P A. CoNS. 
STAT. ANN. § 9781 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1984). See also State v. Garcia, 302 
N.W.2d 643, 644-45 (Minn. 1981) (appellate court has power to review a sentence 
to determine if it is consistent with the guidelines and if any departure from the 
guidelines is justified); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 351, 471 A.2d 370, 387 (1984) 
(appellate court is empowered to review a sentence to determine whether the sen-
tencing guidelines were followed); Commonwealth v. Stafford, 313 Pa. Super. 231, 
234, 459 A.2d 824, 826 (1983) (appellate court's review of a challenged sentence 
begins with an evaluation of the degree to which the sentencing judge followed the 
sentencing guidelines). The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-473, §§ 991-98,98 Stat. 1976, 2017-18 (1984) mandates establishment of 
sentencing guidelines to eliminate disparity in sentencing. The Act requires federal 
judges to explain in writing any departure from the guidelines and provides for ap-
pellate review of a sentence that departs from the guidelines. Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 3742, 98 Stat. 1976, 2011-13 (1984). 
60. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
